The directive that the ACHPR formulates a code of conduct for its members is questionable given the political context that led to it. There is a potential risk that the proposed code will be used to circumscribe and undermine the activities of the ACHPR. Some AU member states have deployed a similar tactic within the auspices of the UN Human Rights Council, albeit with limited success (Limon & Power 2014).
Already contains provisions relating to the independence and impartiality of the ACHPR. The ACHPR members are experts serving in their personal capacity (African Charter, art 31). They are required to be individuals of high morality, integrity and impartiality. Before assuming office, they make a solemn declaration committing to discharge their responsibilities impartially and faithfully (African Charter, art 38). The ACHPR’s Rules of Procedure contain additional provisions meant to address issues arising from real or perceived conflict of interest (Rules 7, 101 and 102).
If such a code is nevertheless adopted, its purpose should be to enhance rather than constrain ACHPR’s work. It should reflect existing best practices, as the code of conduct for UN special procedures or the guidelines on the independence UN human rights treaty bodies do.
Conclusion
The long-term effects of Decision EX.CL/Dec.1015(XXIII) are skype database bound to be dire. It will erode ACHPR’s independence and undermine its mandate. Egypt, which has been leading the backlash against the ACHPR, will become the political figurehead of the AU in 2019. It is likely to use this position to further undermine the ACHPR. Yet, an effective ACHPR is essential to the success of the African human rights system. In its 2016 Annual Report on the state of the world’s human rights, Amnesty International called attention to the fact that “the system of international protection of human rights itself needs to be protected”. This call has never been more urgent.